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STATEMENT OF INTEREST
Amici represent the interests of legislators, doctors and patients in New Hampshire and
throughout the nation. Amici’s primary concern is with providing patients in the United States
the best possible care through a socially and economically sustainable health system. The
trading of prescriber-identities in prescription records for use in drug marketing to physicians
threatens this goal by facilitating highly individualized and coercive promotional environments
that override physician autonomy and contribute to rising prescription drug spending. Amici
support the policy objectives of the New Hampshire Prescription Confidentiality Act, N.H. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 318:47-f, in prohibiting such conduct and have a strong interest in defending its
constitutionality.
The National Legislative Association on Prescription Drug Prices (NLARx) is a
nonpartisan, nonprofit organization of state legislators from across the country who advocate for
lowering prescription drug costs and increasing access to affordable medicines. NLARx acts as a
clearinghouse for legislation and information, assists state legislators and other policymakers in
developing appropriate prescription drug and related legislation, and works with academics,
other policymakers and consumer organizations to support prescription-drug related policy
efforts. The New Hampshire Legislature is a member of NLARx and Rep. Cindy Rosenwald,
sponsor of HB 1346 which is challenged in this action, has been appointed by the Speaker of the
New Hampshire House of Representatives to serve on the NLARx Board of Directors. Bills
similar to the New Hampshire statute at issue in this case were sponsored by NLARx members
and are currently pending in member states West Virginia, Maine, Arizona and Hawaii.
The New Hampshire Medical Society (NHMS) is the largest physician membership
organization in New Hampshire. Since 1791 NHMS has worked to promote the art and science
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of medicine for the betterment of public health. The NHMS represents the concerns of all
medical specialties and regions across the state as well as patient interests through advocacy,
education and commonality. NHMS supported HB 1346 in the New Hampshire Legislature, and
its member physicians testified on the impact of identity data mining on physician privacy and
prescribing patterns.
Prescription Policy Choices (PPC) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan educational and charitable
organization which provides educational and research materials to state legislators, academics,
policymakers, and the general public to assist them to reduce prescription drug prices and
thereby increase access to affordable prescription drugs in the United States. PPC’s primary
focus is promoting and preserving innovative and effective policies aimed at reducing the cost of
prescription drugs in the United States.
SUMMARY
Plaintiffs in this case, IMS Health Inc. and Verispan, LLC, seek a preliminary injunction
to prevent the enforcement of the New Hampshire Prescription Confidentiality Act, N.H. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 318:47-f (“New Hampshire Act” or “Act”). That Act protects consumers and the
privacy interests of doctors by banning the increasingly common practice of using doctoridentifying information in prescription records to facilitate targeting of pharmaceutical marketing
and gifts toward doctors who prescribe the most expensive drugs for their patients. This practice
raises drug costs for all New Hampshire residents and compromises the professional autonomy
of doctors.
Plaintiffs ask this Court for the extraordinary relief of enjoining the enforcement of an
Act, passed with nearly unanimous support in the New Hampshire Legislature and by the
governor, absent any actual application of the Act against an infringing party.
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This brief

addresses the failure of the plaintiffs to show that they are likely to succeed on the merits of
either their First Amendment or Commerce Clause claim.
In regard to the First Amendment, plaintiffs assert a radical and unprecedented argument
that heightened, even strict, scrutiny must be applied to every state regulation that has the effect
of limiting the sales of information products between private contracting parties. The Supreme
Court has never held that the regulation of any information exchanged between contracting
parties for commercial purposes is subject to First Amendment scrutiny, rather than the lenient
rational-basis Due Process standard that has been applied to social and economic regulation since
the downfall of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.
502, 537 (1934) (“[T]here can be no doubt that upon proper occasion and by appropriate
measures the state may regulate a business in any of its aspects.”). Indeed, the most recent
Supreme Court case to address a law restricting the use of the content of a record for secondary
purposes instructed that such laws are “a regulation of conduct,” not of speech. Bartnicki v.
Vopper, 532 U.S. 513, 526-27 (2001). The plaintiffs’ argument would revive Lochner’s ghost,
forcing courts to apply heightened scrutiny to interrogate the means and ends of every regulation
of contract, antitrust conspiracy, confidentiality protection, corporate reporting, consumer
product safety labeling, and other regulation of business practices that involve exchanges of data
or information between private parties.

The Supreme Court has admonished against such

“reliance on the First Amendment as a basis for reviewing economic regulations.” Glickman v.
Wileman Brothers & Elliot, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 476 (1997); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 591, 589 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (warning against
using the commercial speech doctrine “to resurrect the discredited doctrine of cases such as
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Lochner” to strike economic regulations “based on the Court’s own notions of the most
appropriate means for the State to implement its considered policies”).
Should this Court find that the First Amendment is applicable to New Hampshire’s
regulation, then the most lenient standard of First Amendment review should be applied, i.e. that
reserved for “speech solely in the individual interest of the speaker and its specific business
audience.” Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 762 (1985).
Under this deferential standard, the Act must be upheld if it is reasonably tailored to a substantial
government interest. The Act undoubtedly meets this standard. It directly and narrowly serves
the substantial interests of the state assuring the health and welfare of its citizens and reducing
costs that must be borne by the state, by protecting doctors (and thus their patients) from
inappropriate individualized targeting.

And it does so without burdening the ability of

pharmaceutical companies to craft and deliver any message they wish to inform doctors and
patients about their products.
Plaintiffs also urge this court to accept an expansive and radical view of the deregulatory
reach of the dormant Commerce Clause, claiming that the Clause’s infamous “great silences”1
may be used as a basis to strike down, on a facial challenge, legislation which unquestionably
can be applied to in-state conduct and interpreted to regulate transactions that take place with
persons in New Hampshire. Because plaintiffs cannot show that every instance of the Act
necessarily regulates commercial activity undertaken wholly outside of the State of New
Hampshire, their facial challenge must fail.

1

H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 534-535 (1949); cf. Wardair Canada Inc. v.
Florida Dept. of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 17 (1986) (Burger, C. J., concurring in part and concurring
in judgment) (referring to “the cloudy waters of this Courts’ dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine”).
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This brief adopts, and thus does not repeat, the State of New Hampshire’s response to the
Plaintiffs’ third argument – that the detailed and well-defined terms of the Act are
unconstitutionally vague.
BACKGROUND
Nearly a third of the five-fold increase in U.S. spending on drugs over the last decade can
be attributed to the increased efficacy of pharmaceutical marketing efforts that shift doctors’
prescribing from existing, effective, and lower cost (often generic) therapies to new and more
expensive treatments.2 In 2004, the industry spent $27 billion on drug marketing (more than any
other sector in the U.S. on its sales force or media advertising),3 over 85 percent of which was
targeted at doctors.4
Direct marketing of drugs to doctors through sales representatives, called “detailers,” has
been a staple of pharmaceutical marketing practices since the mid-nineteenth century.5 But the
practice of detailing has changed radically over the last decade (paralleling the propulsion of the
industry to the position of the most profitable in the world, with the ten largest pharmaceutical
companies garnering profits equivalent to the other 490 Fortune 500 companies combined).6
Coincident with the rise of physician identity data mining, the pharmaceutical industry increased

2

National Institute for Health Care Management (NIHCM), Prescription Drug Expenditures in
2001: Another Year of Escalating Costs, 2-3 (revised May 6, 2002).
3

Puneet Manchanda & Elisabeth Hokna, Pharmaceutical Innovation and Cost: The Effects and
Role of Direct-to-Physician Marketing in the Pharmaceutical Industry: An Integrative Review, 5
Yale J. of Health Pol’y L. & Ethics 785, 785 (2005).
4

Kaiser Family Foundation, Trends and Indicators in the Changing Health Care Marketplace,
http://www.kff.org/insurance/7031/print-sec1.cfm, exhibit 1.20 (2005).
5

Carl Elliott, The Drug Pushers, Atlantic Monthly (April 2006), available at
www.theatlantic.com/doc/print/200604/drug-reps.
6

Public Citizen Congress Watch, Drug Industry Profits: Hefty Pharmaceutical Company
Margins Dwarf Other Industries (June 2003).
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its spending on direct marketing to doctors by more than 275 percent7 and doubled its sales force
to over 90,000 drug representatives.8 There is now a pharmaceutical sales representative for
every five office-based physicians in the United States.9
Physician identity data mining began in the late 1980s and became a common component
of pharmaceutical marketing tactics by the mid-1990s. The practice began with IMS Health Inc.,
and other pharmaceutical marketing firms, collecting prescription data from pharmacies and
other intermediaries in the prescription processing chain and selling it to pharmaceutical
companies in increasingly sophisticated formats. The practice was dramatically facilitated by
automation of prescription processing by pharmacy benefit managers and other intermediaries,
who were then in a position to sell the information to third parties.10 The data miners also spend
tens of millions of dollars a year leasing the “physician masterfile” from the American Medical
Association, which allows matching of physician identities to Drug Enforcement Agency
numbers for each physician included on every prescription. This information is compiled into
proprietary databases and sold to pharmaceutical companies, who use the databases to provide
their sales force with up-to-the minute information on the prescribing behaviors of every doctor
in a given sales territory.11

7

Kaiser, Trends and Indicators, exhibit 1.20.

8

Manchanda & Hokna, Pharmaceutical Innovation and Cost, 5 Yale J. of Health Pol’y L. &
Ethics at 788.
9

Center for Policy Alternatives, Prescription Drug Marketing,
www.stateaction.org/issues.cfm/issue/prescriptiondrugmarketing.xml

10

See PricewaterhouseCoopers, HCFA Study of the Pharmaceutical Benefit Management
Industry, HCFA Contract No. 500-97-0399/0097, 5 (June 2001) (describing rapid growth of
PBM industry in 1990s).
11

See Leg. Hist. at 94-97 (Liz Kowalczyk, Drug Companies’ Secret Reports Outrage Doctors,
The Boston Globe, A1 (May 25, 2003)); id. at 104-114 (Emily Clayton, ‘Tis Always the Season
for Giving: A White Paper on the Practice and Problems of Pharmaceutical Detailing,
CALPIRG (September 2004)); see also Jake Whitney, Big (Brother) Pharma: How Drug Reps
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Physician identity data mining facilitates coercive pharmaceutical marketing efforts in
several key ways. First, armed with data about prescribing habits, the sales representatives focus
their resources on high volume prescribers, brand-loyal doctors, “cowboys” who are the first to
prescribe new medicines, and doctors who have recently switched away from the brand or
otherwise changed their prescribing behavior in a way that makes them look susceptible to a
sales call.12
Second, they use the information to target and tailor rewards to their best-prescribing
“customers,” thus heightening the quid pro quo attributes of drug representative gift-giving.
While low-value targets receive the routine gifts – small meals, pens, notepads, etc. – the high
value targets can receive weekly, even daily, meals for their entire staff, luxury vacations in the
guise of educational seminars, and can earn thousands – even hundreds of thousands – of dollars
a year as speakers and “consultants” on drug company junkets.13
Third, monitoring of prescribing practices also allows the sales representative to assess
the impact of various gifts and messages on a particular physician to help them select the most

Know Which Doctors to Target, The New Republic, TNR Online,
www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=w060828&s=whitney082906 (August 29, 2006); Elliott, The Drug
Pushers, supra; Robert Steinbrook, For Sale: Physicians’ Prescribing Data, 354 New Eng. J.
Med. 2745 (2006); Stephanie Saul, Doctors Object to Gathering of Drug Data, N.Y. Times
(May 4, 2006), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/04/business/04prescribe.html?ex=1304395200&en=bf193ef7c
92f2476&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss; Shannon Brownlee & Jeanne Lenzer, Spin
Doctored: How Drug Companies Keep Tabs on Physicians, Slate (May 31, 2005), available at
www.slate.com/id/2119712/
12

See Saul, Doctors Object, supra at * 2; Elliott, The Drug Pushers, supra at *7.

13

See Leg. Hist. at 108-109 (Clayton, ‘Tis Always the Season for Giving) (describing “five and
even six figure checks” given to doctors to induce prescription writing); Elliott, The Drug
Pushers, supra at *7-8.; Stephanie Saul, Drug Makers Pay for Lunch as the Pitch, N.Y. Times
(July 28, 2006), available at
www.nytimes.com/2006/07/28/business/28lunch.html?ex=1311739200&en=704a144090f77cda
&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss: Whitney, Big (Brother) Pharma, supra at *2.
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effective set of rewards. A doctor who did not respond to a meal for the staff may next time
receive an invitation to a steak dinner or a ball game; the doctor that did not respond to the
flirtatious former cheerleader may next time receive a solicitation from a representative with a
science background and a briefcase full of studies.14
Fourth, doctors are informed that they are being monitored – through messages of
appreciation for writing prescriptions,15 or messages of disappointment that they are not
prescribing what was implicitly promised.16

This awareness of being monitored (and the

pressure to conform thereby exerted) is internalized by physicians as each prescription is written
with knowledge that the action is subject to the watchful eye of the drug representative.17
The combination of identity data mining and targeted detailing is extremely effective at
prompting physicians to alter their prescribing behavior, often in ways that have no or negative
therapeutic benefit to the patient while raising drug costs. Numerous studies demonstrate that
“[p]hysicians’ use of targeted prescriptions increases substantially after visits with sales

14

See Elliott, The Drug Pushers, supra at *7-8; Leg. Hist at 95-96 (Kowalczyk, Drug
Companies’ Secret Reports).
15

See Saul, Doctors Object, supra (reporting that “Dr. Brad Wexler . . . was surprised four years
ago when pharmaceutical representatives began thanking him for writing prescriptions – the first
time he realized that the drug representatives had information he assumed was private”).
16

See Elliott, The Drug Pushers, supra at *7 (reporting that with data mining reports “drug reps
could detect deception immediately”); Leg. Hist. at 33 (Testimony of Ms. Finocchiaro, Director
of Cholesterol Management Center, Catholic Medical Center) (describing sales representative
promise of breakfast for staff every week if she will “write me two prescriptions every week,”
which the sales representative checked through mining data and returned complaining that “you
didn’t write my two prescriptions”).

17

Cf. Michel Foucault, The Eye of Power, in Power/Knowledge (1974) (discussing the exertion
of power over individual behavior through a “system of surveillance,” an “inspecting gaze, a
gaze which each individual under its weight will end by interiorisation to the point that he is his
own overseer”); Tal Z. Zarsky, Mine your Own Business!: Making the Case for the Implications
of the Data Mining of Personal Information in the Forum of Public Opinion, 5 Y. J. L. & Tech.
1, 38-40 (2003) (discussing potential for an “autonomy trap” created by the use of data mining to
alter preferences of targeted purchasers).
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representatives.”18 Other studies show that the industry investments of tens of billions of dollars
every year on direct marketing of drugs to doctors yield returns of over $10 for every dollar
spent.19
Sellers of more cost-effective drugs with lower profit margins often have no incentive to
undertake the large investment necessary for physician marketing, and therefore the practice of
detailing is highly biased in favor of promoting the most expensive products.20 One study
showed, for example, that marketing branded calcium channel blockers for high blood pressure
treatment instead of the less expensive therapies recommended by national treatment guidelines
increased U.S. health expenditures by $3 billion in 1996 alone.21
It is in this context that New Hampshire passed the Prescription Confidentiality Act,
which regulates only the conduct of how prescription data is sold and used. The Act requires

18

Declaration of Avorn and Kesselheim at 6 (citing N Lurie, E.C. Rich, D.E. Simpson, et. al.,
Pharmaceutical Representatives in Academic Medical Centers, 5 J. Gen. Intern. Med. 240-43
(1990). See also Declaration of Jerry Avorn, M.D. and Aaron S. Kesselheim, M.D., J.D., pp. 3-5
(discussing studies demonstrating the “powerful effect [of gifts and detailing] on driving drug
utilization”); Abigail Caplovitz, Turning Medicine Into Snake Oil: How Pharmaceutical
Marketers Put Patients at Risk, NJPIRG Law and Policy Center, 5 (2006) (reviewing studies);
Manchanda & Hokna, Pharmaceutical Innovation and Cost, 5 Yale J. Health Pol’y L. & Ethics
at 797-808 (reviewing studies). See, e.g. H. Prosser, S. Almond & T. Walley, Influences on GPs
Decisions to Prescribe New Drugs – the Importance of Who Says What, 20 Family Practice 61
(2003); Dana J, Loewenstein G. A social science perspective on gifts to physicians from industry,
290 JAMA 252 (2003).
19

Elliott, The Drug Pushers, supra at *1.

20

See Declaration of Avorn and Kesselheim at 6 (noting that “[t]here is virtually no economic
incentive for the manufacturers of generic drugs to send sales representatives”); Caplovitz,
Turning Medicine Into Snake Oil, supra (discussing incentives and practices of sales
representatives misrepresenting therapeutic value and indications for medicines to increase
sales).

21

Declaration of Avorn & Kesselheim at 7, discussing Cardarelli R, Licciardone JC, Taylor LG,
A cross-sectional evidence-based review of pharmaceutical promotional marketing brochures
and their underlying studies: Is what they tell us important and true? 7 BMC Fam Pract 13
(2006). Cf. Leg. Hist. at 14 (testimony that the least and most expensive calcium channel
blocker on the New Hampshire Medicaid formulary is $13.50 vs. $87.30 per month
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that certain persons in custody of prescription records keep individualized patient and prescriber
information in the records confidential, so that it cannot be used to facilitate inappropriate
targeting for pharmaceutical marketing.
ARGUMENT
“[A] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy that may be granted only by a
clear demonstration by a plaintiff of the merits of such a request.” 13 Moore's Fed. Prac. §
65.20, at 65-29 (3d ed.1998) (footnotes omitted). To succeed in their effort to enjoin the
enforcement of the New Hampshire Act, plaintiffs must show that: (1) they are likely to succeed
on the merits; (2) absent the injunction they will suffer irreparable harm; (3) their injury
outweighs any harm the granting of the injunction would inflict upon the State; and (4) the public
interest will not be adversely affected by the injunction. Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 207
F.3d 43, 47 (1st Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). This brief focuses on the first prong of the
analysis: whether plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their First Amendment and
Commerce Clause Claims.
I.

THERE IS NO LIKELIHOOD THAT PLAINTIFFS WILL SUCCEED ON
THE MERITS.

In this case, the plaintiffs’ burden is especially high because they seek to enjoin the Act
on a facial challenge, before it is ever enforced. In part to protect the safeguards inherent in the
adversarial system, the facial challenge is “the most difficult challenge to mount successfully,
since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would
be valid.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).

respectively).
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A.

The Act Does Not Regulate Speech Protected by the First Amendment.

Plaintiffs’ attempt to enjoin enforcement of the New Hampshire Act on First Amendment
grounds must be rejected because the Act regulates only the commercialization of prescription
drug records, not any “speech” protected by the First Amendment.
The First Amendment, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, limits
the abilities of states to regulate speech, not conduct. “[I]t has never been deemed an abridgment
of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct
was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or
printed.” Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., __ U.S. __, 126 S.Ct.
1297, 1308 (2006) (quoting Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949)).
The New Hampshire Act regulates only certain conduct performed with prescription
records by those that come into their possession in the course of their business. Specifically, it
states that records containing patient- or prescriber-identifiable data “shall not be licensed,
transferred, used, or sold . . . for any commercial purpose” not related to the filling of the
prescription or obtaining reimbursement for it. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 318:47-f. By narrowly
restraining the use of prescription records, the New Hampshire Act is substantively similar to the
aspects of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 approved of by the Supreme
Court in Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 513 (2001).
In Bartnicki, the Court struck down a section of the statute that constituted a “naked
prohibition against disclosures” of information obtained through a wiretap, but approved of the
section of the law that penalized any person who “uses . . . the contents of” a wiretapped
communication. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(d).

The court recognized cases holding that the use

prohibition made it unlawful to “use an illegally intercepted communication . . . to create a
competing product,” “in trading in securities,” “to prepare strategy for contract negotiations,” or
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“to discipline a subordinate.” Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 527 n.10. These prohibitions did not
implicate the First Amendment, the Court explained, because “the prohibition against the ‘use’
of the contents of an illegal intraception” is “a regulation of conduct.” 532 U.S. at 526-27.
Like the section of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act approved of by the court
in Bartnicki, the New Hampshire Act regulates certain uses of the content of a record and
thereby regulates conduct, not speech. The Act is substantially similar to the many “secondary
use” regulations that inhibit information provided for one purpose from being used for other
purposes, which are “unproblematic from a First Amendment perspective.” Neil M. Richards,
Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 1149, 1190 (2005).
Federal and state laws contain numerous secondary use regulations that are similar in
nature to the New Hampshire Act. For example, federal law: prohibits information furnished to
the Census from being “used to the detriment of any respondent,” 13 U.S.C. §8(c); prohibits
release of individually identifiable health information, Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936; prohibits disclosures of
“personally identifiable information concerning any consumer” of a video rental establishment,
Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §2710-2711, or of a cable operator, Cable
Communications Policy Act, 47 U.S.C. §551(c)(1); requires that internet service providers “not
knowingly divulge” subscriber information and communications except for certain public
purposes, 18 U.S.C.A. §2702; and requires states to limit the disclosure of drivers’ personal
identifying information without their consent, Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §§
2721-25. See Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000) (upholding Driver’s Privacy Protection Act
as valid regulation of commerce). Similarly, states: prohibit divulging, publishing or receiving
social security numbers in certain forms, Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.85(a); regulate the use and
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disclosure of information “obtained in connection with a motor vehicle record,” Ohio Rev. Code
§ 4501.27(A); require that a news-gathering organization “shall not use or distribute” accident
reports “for a commercial purpose other than the news-gathering organization's publication or
broadcasting of the information,” Ky. Rev. Stat. § 189.635, see Amelkin v. McClure, 330 F.3d
822, 827 (2003) (holding that § 189.635 “does not restrict or even regulate expression”); and
declare that “prescription records, physician orders and other records related to any patient care
or medical condition(s) of a patient that are maintained by a pharmacy . . . shall be considered
confidential,” 20 Mo. Code of State Regulations 2220-2. Such laws regulate the use of data and
other information and thus constitute “a regulation of conduct,” not speech. Bartnicki, 532 U.S.
at 526-27. This is true without regard to how much more (or less) speech might occur if the uses
of the data were not regulated. Otherwise, Bartnicki could not have held as it did.
The Act does not restrict corporations from advertising to customers or doctors, or
otherwise selecting and transmitting sales messages that would fall within the definition of
“commercial speech”. See Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliot, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 476
(1997) (holding “the standard appropriate for the review of economic regulation,” not the First
Amendment, applicable where there is “no restraint on the freedom of any producer to
communicate any message to any audience”).22

Under the Act, there is no limit on any

prescribing pharmaceutical company’s ability to communicate “vital information about the
market” through “accurate information about the availability of goods and services.” 44
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 495-96 (1996). Unlike the state regulations in
any of the Supreme Court cases involving unconstitutional regulations of advertising, the Act
does not ban any industry from engaging in commercial advertising, cf. Cent. Hudson Gas &

22

Cf. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 762 n.8 (“We do not hold [that a credit report is]
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Elec. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (striking down ban on
promotional advertising by electric utilities), does not limit the substance of messages that may
be disseminated, cf. 44 Liquormart, Inc., 517 U.S. at 495-96 (striking down ban on
advertisement of liquor prices), and does not limit the forums available for commercial
advertising, cf. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (striking down ban
on certain outdoor advertising display signs); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 507 U.S.
410 (1993) (striking down ban of commercial handbills on public property); Edenfield v. Fane,
507 U.S. 761 (1993) (striking down ban on in-person solicitation by certified public
accountants). Rather, the Act simply prevents companies from using prescribing data to target
doctors to receive commercial speech.
At bottom, this Court is reviewing one of the “[n]umerous examples” where the
regulation of exchanges of information between private firms does not trigger First Amendment
scrutiny. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978). See id. (noting the lack of
First Amendment scrutiny for regulation of “the exchange of information about securities,
corporate proxy statements, the exchange of price and production information among
competitors, and employers’ threats of retaliation for the labor activities of employees”)
(citations omitted).23 Accordingly, the Act “is a species of economic regulation that should

commercial speech”).
23

See also Frederick Schauer, Commercial Speech and the Architecture of the First Amendment,
56 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1181, 1183-84 (1988) (noting “a vast range” of exchanges of information
between companies the regulation of which does not implicate the First Amendment, including
“communications to offerees, stockholders, and investors now regulated by various state and
federal securities laws, including the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934; numerous communications among business executives about prices and business practices
now regulated by the Sherman Antitrust Act; communications about working conditions and the
like now regulated by the National Labor Relations Act; representations about products and
services now regulated by the Federal Trade Commission and the Food and Drug
Administration; representations about products now regulated by various consumer protection
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enjoy the same strong presumption of validity that [the court must] accord to other policy
judgments made by [a state].” Glickman, 521 U.S. at 477.
The plaintiffs do not argue that the New Hampshire Act lacks a rational basis and do not
contend that the law cannot survive the deferential scrutiny reserved for constitutional review of
economic regulations. See FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313-314 (1993);
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). Accordingly, they have failed to
show that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their substantive challenge to the means and
ends of the Act.
B.

If the First Amendment Were to Apply, the Act Would Nevertheless be a
Valid Regulation of Commercial Speech.

Assuming arguendo that the Court finds that the New Hampshire Act is a regulation of
speech protected by the First Amendment, the plaintiffs have nonetheless failed to show that the
Act is unconstitutional under what would be the applicable (and most lenient) standard of First
Amendment review.
The Supreme Court has instructed that commercial speech must be afforded First
Amendment protection “commensurate with its position in relation to other constitutionally
protected expression.” Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 555 (2001). Thus blanket
bans on commercial advertising to the general public, which “not only hinder consumer choice,
but also impede debate over central issues of public policy,” 44 Liquormart, Inc., 517 U.S. at
503, are subject to more exacting scrutiny and “rarely survive constitutional review.” Id. at 504;

laws, by the Uniform Commercial Code, and by the common law of warranty and contract;
statements about willingness to enter into a contract now regulated by the common law of
contract; and so on and on”) (internal citations omitted); Robert Post, The Constitutional Status
of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA Law. Rev. 1, 20-25 (2000) (listing examples); Frederick
Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional
Salience, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1765, 1777-787 (2004) (same).
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see id

at 505, 507 (requiring that the law banning all price advertising by liquor sellers

“significantly” advance a substantial state interest and be “no more extensive than necessary”).
Where the state restricts one type of advertising to the public, e.g. in-person solicitations, but
leaves other channels of communication available, a less strict form of constitutional scrutiny has
been applied. See Edenfield, 507 U.S. 767 (explaining that ban on in-person solicitation by
public accountants “need only be tailored in a reasonable manner to serve a substantial state
interest”). Finally, in a related context, the Court has explained that the least demanding form of
constitutional protection is warranted for “speech solely in the individual interest of the speaker
and its specific business audience.” Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472
U.S. 749, 762 (1985) (holding that credit report delivered to five business subscribers was
entitled to “reduced constitutional protection” and could be subject to state defamation damages
without showing of actual malice).
The New Hampshire Act does not ban all pharmaceutical advertising, or even one type of
such advertising (e.g. in-person solicitations), and therefore, as we argue above, the commercial
speech doctrine is inapplicable. If it is applied, it is clear that its most deferential form must be
used. Thus, citing Dun & Bradstreet, the D.C. Circuit held that “targeted marketing lists” sold to
clients by credit reporting agencies “are private speech warranting only qualified constitutional
protection.” Trans Union Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 267 F.3d 1138, 1140-41 (D.C. Cir.
2001). The D.C. Circuit therefore applied a deferential form of intermediate scrutiny to the
FTC’s regulation of the sale of the marketing lists, upholding their use despite arguments that it
was possible to meet the ends of the legislation in a manner less invasive to the regulated
corporations’ interests. See id. at 1143 (holding that the First Amendment “does not obligate
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courts to invalidate a remedial scheme because some alternative solution is marginally less
intrusive”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The New Hampshire Act was designed to serve two related goals: (1) to protect the
privacy interests of patients and doctors in prescription records; and (2) to save the state,
consumers and businesses money on prescription drug spending.24

The Act substantially

advances each goal without unduly limiting First Amendment protected speech, and thereby
survives constitutional scrutiny.
The Act’s relation to the legitimate state interest in controlling drug prices and promoting
public health objectives is well canvassed by the amicus brief of AARP et. al. and Amici adopt
those arguments in total. In addition, it is important to acknowledge the second objective of the
Act implicated by this suit – protecting the privacy interests of doctors and the records they
create when they write prescriptions.25

As in Trans Union Corp., this interest is directly

advanced by the Act because “the government cannot promote its interest (protection of personal
financial data) except by regulating speech because the speech itself (disseminating of financial
data) causes the very harm the government seeks to prevent.” 267 F.3d at 1142.
The Supreme Court and lower courts have frequently recognized that governments have a
legitimate interest in protecting individuals against particularly invasive and coercive solicitation
practices. See Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 624-25 (1995) (recognizing
substantial interest in protecting privacy of personal injury victims by prohibiting solicitation by
lawyers); Mainstream Mktg. Serv., Inc v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 358 F.3d 1228, 1238 (10th Cir.
2004) (recognizing substantial government interest in preventing “coercive sales practices”); Van

24

See Leg. Hist. at 9-11 (statement of Representative Rosenwald).

25

Plaintiffs do not challenge the State’s interests in protecting the privacy interests of patients.
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Bergen v. State of Minnesota, 59 F.3d 1541, 1555 (8th Cir.1995) (recognizing substantial
interest, motivated by protecting consumer privacy, in limiting use of unsolicited sales calls by
auto-dialing/announcing devices); Lanphere & Urbaniak v. State of Colorado, 21 F.3d 1508,
1514-15 (10th Cir.1994) (recognizing substantial interest in protecting privacy of persons
charged with misdemeanor traffic offenses and DUI).
Plaintiffs do not challenge patients’ interests in not being targeted for direct-to-consumer
advertising based on prescription data monitoring.

Rather, they suggest that there is no

substantial interest in protecting doctors from targeted advertising. But even if doctors’ interests
in being free from such targeting were not alone sufficient, with prescription medications doctors
act as patients’ agents. With medicines, it is the doctors, not the patients, who decide what
medicines to prescribe and therefore make the choices about what medicines will be consumed.
As Director of Pharmacy Services at New Hampshire Community Hospital explained to the New
Hampshire Legislature:
Writing a prescription is unlike any other form of purchase. A
physician makes a decision that not only influences, but
“prescribes” what his patient needs to purchase. Think of the
financial stability that General Motors would experience if one
person could decide which cars others must purchase!
Leg. Hist. at 62.
It is because doctors prescribe patients’ pharmaceutical consumption choices that doctors
are the target of over 85 percent of all marketing expenditures by pharmaceutical companies and
are thus most likely to be subjected to harassing solicitations facilitated by commercial trading of
prescription data. As with consumers in other contexts, New Hampshire has a substantial
interest in protecting the privacy and autonomy interests of doctors in not being subjected to
coercive marketing practices based on the release and monitoring of their prescribing behavior.
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The New Hampshire Act is narrowly tailored to restrict no more speech than necessary to
meet its goals – indeed, it restricts no speech at all. The Act does not regulate the practice of
pharmaceutical detailing in New Hampshire, which is undoubtedly commercial speech afforded
some measure of protection under the First Amendment. Nor does it prohibit the use or sale of
prescription information coded by geographical area or other format that does not divulge the
identity of individual prescribers, as is the common practice in Europe, Canada and much of the
rest of the world.26 In this way, is it a narrowly tailored to prevent the data from being used to
facilitate the most abusive practices in pharmaceutical marketing.
C.

Plaintiffs are not Likely to Succeed on their Facial Challenge Based on
the Commerce Clause.

Plaintiffs’ attempt to enjoin enforcement of the New Hampshire Act based on the
argument that it may be applied to commerce taking place wholly outside of the state must be
rejected because they fail to establish “that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act
would be valid.” Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745.
The plaintiffs’ Commerce Clause argument is based on the Supreme Court’s line of cases
holding that the “Commerce Clause . . . precludes the application of a state statute to commerce
that takes place wholly outside of the State’s Borders.” Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624,
642-43 (1982). Under this doctrine, the Court struck down an Illinois “blue sky” law that
regulated corporate takeovers “which would not affect a single Illinois shareholder,” id. at 642,
as well as price affirmation statutes (requiring prices in one state to be no higher than in another
state) the necessary effect of which was to control product prices outside of the regulating state.

26

See Steve Niles, No Way to Fill in the Blanks, 25 Euromoney Institutional Investor 1 (May 1,
2006) (noting that “in Europe, Canada, and many other parts of the world” prescription data is
available only in a “brick” – “a statistical group put together in such a way that you’re not
supposed to be able to work out which doctor is writing what”).
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See Healy v. Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324, 337-38 (1989) (explaining that “the interaction of the
Connecticut affirmation statute with the Massachusetts beer-pricing statute . . . has the practical
effect of controlling Massachusetts prices”). The Commerce Clause does not, however, ban all
state regulation that reaches out-of-state parties doing in-state business. A state law may reach
out-of-state conduct where the regulated transactions “wind up within their borders,” K-S
Pharmacies, Inc. v. Am. Home Prod., Corp., 962 F.2d 728, 731 (7th Cir. 1992); see also PhRMA
v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 669 (2003) (rejecting Commerce Clause challenge based on allegation
that “Maine’s regulation of the terms of transactions that occur elsewhere”); In re Brand Name
Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 612 (7th Cir. 1997) (upholding application of
state price fixing prohibition to an interstate scheme of manufacturers and wholesalers even
though “it is doubtful that any of the price-fixed sales attacked in the suit took place in intrastate
rather than interstate commerce”) or otherwise involve an in-state party, Goldmen & Co., Inc. v.
New Jersey Bureau of Securities, 163 F.3d 780, 787 (3rd Cir. 1998) (“contracts formed between
citizens in different states implicate the regulatory interests of both states”).
It is not disputed that sales and transfers of prescriber-identified prescription drug records
take place in New Hampshire, “wind up within” New Hampshire, K-S Pharmacies, 962 F.2d
at 731, or otherwise involve New Hampshire contracting parties, Goldmen, 163 F.3d at 787.
Accordingly, the Act is clearly constitutional in at least some of its applications and therefore the
plaintiffs cannot show they are likely to prevail on a facial Commerce Clause claim.
Plaintiffs cannot succeed on their Commerce Clause challenge based solely on their
argument that ambiguous language in the Act could be interpreted to apply to out-of-state
conduct. Plaintiffs base their claim in large part on the argument that the ban on certain sales or
transfers of “records relative to prescriber identifiable data” is not explicitly restricted to sales or
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transfers of records in or from New Hampshire. Plaintiffs’ Brief at 59. A similar claim was
rejected by the 7th Circuit in K-S Pharmacies, 962 F.2d at 730-31. There, the plaintiffs argued
that a statute violated the Commerce Clause by banning pharmaceutical prices in Wisconsin
higher than those given to its “most favored purchaser,” without specifying that the most favored
purchaser must also be in Wisconsin. The Court rejected the challenge, explaining that “[i]t is all
but certain that the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, if given the chance, would interpret ‘most
favored purchaser’ to mean ‘most favored purchaser in Wisconsin’” to “conform the legislation
to the limits of state power.” Id.27 New Hampshire courts can be similarly expected to conform
the language of the Act to the limits of its power.
Finally, the degree to which any particular enforcement of the Act may transgress the
State’s authority under the Commerce Clause is not appropriate to review on a facial challenge.
Determining the scope of the in-state nexus in a particular transaction is a highly fact-intensive
process that is not appropriate for summary resolution absent an actual enforcement of the Act.
See Country Classic Dairies v. Milk Control Bureau, 847 F.2d 593 (9th Cir. 1988) (remanding
commerce clause claim for trial to develop facts “detailing each step in the interstate
commerce”); Farmland Dairies v. McGuire, 789 F. Supp. 1243, 1255-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
(denying summary judgment on Commerce Clause challenge to New York regulation of milk
claimed to be destined for New Jersey); Mississippi ex. rel. Patterson v. Pure Vac Dairy Prod.
Corp., 251 Miss. 457, 469 (1964) (applying Mississippi law to out-of-state contract found to be a
“fiction of duality” erected to evade Mississippi regulation).

27

Cf. Taylor v. Rodale, Inc. 2004 WL 1196145, *2 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (construing Pennsylvania law
to avoid extraterritorial application); cf. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)
(expressing “longstanding principle” that federal legislation is interpreted to “apply only within
the jurisdiction of the United States”).
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction should be
denied.
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